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Abstract. Home robots may come with many sophisticated built-
in abilities, however there will always be a degree of customization
needed for each user and environment. Ideally this should be accom-
plished through one-shot learning, as collecting the large number of
examples needed for statistical inference is tedious. A particularly
appealing approach is to simply explain to the robot, via speech, what
it should be doing. In this paper we describe the ALIA cognitive ar-
chitecture that is able to effectively incorporate user-supplied advice
and prohibitions in this manner. The functioning of the implemented
system on a small robot is illustrated by an associated video [11].
1 INTRODUCTION
A typical home robot of the future might have built-in navigation,
object recognition, task planning, and dexterous manipulation. Yet,
despite these sophisticated capabilities, there are still things it cannot
know when it first arrives. For instance, what a particular room in
the house is called, even if it can identify the general type. Is this
Freddy’s bedroom or Janey’s? Is the room with the couch the “living
room”, “den”, “parlor”, or “TV room”? And what objects are in the
house, such as “Pookie”, Janey’s favorite stuffed animal?
Beyond naming, there are also the tasks that the owner wants per-
formed. For instance, depending on the user, “tidy up” might mean:
• shove everything under the bed
• throw out all the food wrappers then stuff everything under the
bed
• return the dirty dishes to the kitchen and put the clothes in the
hamper
• carefully put all the toys back into their standard places
How does one impart this knowledge to the robot so it can be maxi-
mally useful?
The solution pursued in the ALIA architecture is to just explain
these things in English, something that can hopefully be done by a
non-technical user. Arguably there are facets of tasks that are diffi-
cult to put into words, such as particular locations, paths, or forces
to be applied. These might be better handled through pointing [10],
demonstration/imitation [15, 34], and puppeting [33, 29], respec-
tively. Yet, language is often adequate to describe the bulk of a task,
and it is still valuable as glue to hold the non-verbal elements to-
gether. Such learning-by-being-told may appear trivial, but it is tricky
to implement in practice. In particular, the primitives and control
structures in the reasoning system must be tailored to reflect the con-
structs used by language in order to allow smooth translation. In a
rough sense, the ALIA system strives to be an Advice Taker as envi-
sioned in [27].
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To reason, ALIA builds on a kernel of grounding functions. Some
of these link to action-like procedures, such as setting the speed of the
wheels or configuring the manipulator. Others invoke sensory anal-
ysis routines, like finding all red objects or determining if there is a
collision-free path to some destination. The kernel can be thought of
as the fresh-from-the-factory capabilities of the base platform. ALIA
then allows programs of more complexity to be created on top of
these libraries using natural language utterances to string them to-
gether.
2 RELATEDWORK
There is a long history of programming by demonstration in robotics
[3]. Some systems attempt to infer steps within a complex motion or
task and convert this into an FSM or STRIPS representation [28, 14]
using multiple training sessions. More recent systems allow refine-
ments of a single demonstration through use of a simulator and edi-
tor [1]. Others attempt to build neural-net action models from pas-
sive observation of video [35]. While building such controllers is
clearly useful, binding them to verbal commands is often an af-
terthought, and combination of taught elements is typically accom-
plished through a graphical interface [18] instead of via natural lan-
guage. One notable exception is [17] where actions are targeted to
certain objects called out through verbal referring expressions.
Several large-scale cognitive architectures include both learning
and a natural language component. The ambitious LAAS-CNRS ar-
chitecture [26, 25, 8] has dialog control, an ontology interface, spa-
tial relation understanding, and anaphora resolution. Yet the empha-
sis here was on using language to set up planning problems, rather
than as a conduit for acquiring new procedural knowledge. DIARC
[5] is another complex architecture centered around a planner. It does
an impressive job of extracting the parameterization of a new action,
as well as pre- and post-conditions, directly from natural language.
It can also be taught about command expansions, such as what “fol-
low me” means [6]. An enhanced version [31] can learn sequences
and object names, similar to [9]. However it is largely confined to
the deliberative action domain and it is unclear whether it could be
extended to reactive routines or social conventions.
Our system is probably most similar in spirit to [7], except this
uses temporal answer set programming instead of semantic nets and a
production system. Overall, we present a relatively simple alternative
to prior work, yet one that can still mediate several kinds of useful
learning interactions, as will be described in the following sections.
3 ALIA COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
Our emphasis on acquiring procedural knowledge directly from nat-
ural language is what sets ALIA apart from many other cognitive
architectures. As a consequence of this, we have chosen a symbolic
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Figure 1. The ALIA reasoning system uses a set of rules to interpret situations, and a set of operators to generate behaviors. The output of the controller relies
on a set of grounding functions intrinsic to the deployment platform, in this case a small forklift robot.
rule-based reasoner as the core of our system. Language most con-
veniently reduces to symbolic constructs, while reasoning and action
recommendations are most often communicated in small chunks like
rules. Fortunately, the brittleness of symbolic systems can be amelio-
rated by grounding the system in more robust statistical primitives,
and the often chaotic control structure of rule-based systems can be
tamed through a collection of mechanisms, as will be described later.
Fig. 1 shows the overall structure of the implemented robot con-
troller. Our reasoning subsystem is split into declarative and proce-
dural parts, amplifying the dichotomy proposed in [2]. That is, there
are inference rules that derive new facts, and separate policy opera-
tors that control action. Both of these can be taught directly by the
user through the natural language interface. In operation, something
akin to a goal is generally posted by the user to the attention buffer.
A small amount of rule-based reasoning is done to elaborate the sit-
uation, then a policy operator is selected for execution in the action
tree. To actually accomplish a task, the system relies on a grounding
kernel that interfaces with the robot hardware.
An important part of our solution is the three-level memory struc-
ture shown in Fig. 2 (top). At the center is the attention buffer which
holds recent facts and commands and is the primary conscious guide
for the agent’s activities. There can be multiple focal items active
simultaneously. Once an item has been “handled” it is deactivated
but persists in the attention buffer for a short amount of time. Out-
side attention there is working memory holding all the ancillary as-
sertions linked to current or recently deactivated items. Finally, the
outermost layer is the halo which contains all those facts that are on
the tip of your tongue but which only surface if needed. They remain
unconscious in the sense that they cannot be used to make further
deductions.
The declarative representation used in our system is shown in
Fig. 2 (bottom), with nodes representing both objects and predicates.
The actual names assigned to the nodes are irrelevant and are merely
for debugging purposes. Predicate nodes have directed links marked
by the role for each argument. Here hq means “has quality” and ako
means “a kind of”. Each node can have a belief value associated
with it as well as a lexical item (such as “orange” for hq-3) giving
the system a strong Whorfian flavor. Predicates can also be modified
by other predicates. For instance, the network depicted expresses not
only that some object is orange, but also makes explicit that orange
is a color.
These networks are relatively simple, along the lines of [20] rather
than more elaborate formalisms such as [32, 4]. The overall sys-
Figure 2. Our system has three levels of memory (top). Attention is used to
guide action, working memory establishes context, and the halo holds specu-
lative deductions. Each level consists of semantic net assertions (bottom).
tem is largely concerned with understanding procedural sequences
and interpreting imperative commands. There is no explicit model of
time and hence no tense or modality annotations are required, un-
like in narrative comprehension. Moreover, our networks are built
on-demand and disposed of a short while later. They do not accrete
into a large knowledge base over time that needs to be updated and
checked for consistency.
As shown in Fig. 3, within the reasoning subsystem inference
about facts is performed by rules (top), whereas advice about ac-
tions is conveyed by operators (bottom). The description of applica-
ble situations is encoded as a semantic network, as are the details
of the conclusions to be drawn or actions to be taken. Each rule can
have a degree of belief in its conclusion, while each operator can
have a preference value associated with its selection. The examples
here correspond to the natural language inputs “Girls are (usually)
female” and “To run away, (you could) drive backward”, where the
parenthesized elements correspond to belief and preference, respec-
tively. Suitable structured outputs are automatically derived from ei-
ther text or speech – they do not need to be entered in the intermediate
form depicted here.
The reasoning engine works via forward chaining, where stimulus
leads to response. This allows the system to spontaneously react to
circumstances and exhibit initiative. However unbridled chaining can
lead to various sorts of runaway, such as counting. Suppose there
Figure 3. Rules are deductions based on working memory with conclu-
sions asserted in the halo. Operators are triggered by elements of the attention
buffer and have a response composed of action directives.
is a rule that says “if x then successor(x) = x + 1” and we present
the system with the number 2. We certainly do not want it to lock
up while enumerating all the values up to infinity. There are related
problems when computing deductive closure in systems derived from
formal logic. First, a lot of effort can be expended recomputing the
world state every time some fact changes. Second, human-supplied
rules are often only locally consistent (bounded rationality) and can
lead to global contradictions despite still being usable.
For this reason, we limit deduction to two steps. Rules can only
be matched against items in working memory, but then assert their
conclusions in the halo. A version of concatenation [16] or chunking
[23] can be used to get deeper lookahead, although this is often not
necessary. Moreover, because the halo is conceptually ephemeral and
is constantly being re-derived as the contents of working memory
change, having a limited horizon saves substantial work.
Operators differ from rules in that they have intentional tags at-
tached to particular nodes in the network. There are a number of such
directives including: NOTE, DO, ANTE, POST, CHK, FIND, ACH,
KEEP, PUNT, and FCN. These differ primarily in how success is
measured and how backtracking is controlled. For instance, a NOTE
directive typically corresponds to a newly asserted fact. When this
shows up in the attention buffer, the system selects an operator with
a NOTE-based triggering condition to handle it. If the operator runs
to completion, the top-level NOTE succeeds and is dismissed from
the attention buffer. Control then passes to some other directive. If
the operator fails, a different operator is tried next. If no operators
remain, the top-level NOTE is still considered to have succeeded. By
contrast, a DO directive usually corresponds to a command. As with
NOTE, operators are tried successively until one succeeds. However,
if there are no applicable operators, or all the selected ones fail, the
DO directive itself fails.
Yet the DO operator is actually more complicated than NOTE be-
cause it gets automatically converted to the sequence ANTE-DO-
POST. This allows the attachment of before and after methods. That
is, when the system schedules a DO for execution it first attempts to
run all operators with matching ANTE triggers. Some of these may
succeed while others fail, or there may be none to begin with. In
any of these cases, only once all the possibilities are exhausted does
control pass to the main DO directive. In this way the system makes
sure that it has all the relevant information that might be needed be-
fore selecting an operator for DO. Similarly, no matter whether DO
eventually succeeds or fails, once it is done all the applicable POST
operators are called. This allows the robot to update its world state,
or more gracefully recover from failures.
Unfortunately, production systems also suffer from interference
between rules when the set grows large. One way around this is to
partition the rules into a number of groups that are suited for different
purposes. Following this approach, each of our operators has a trigger
condition akin to a goal, and an enablement specification more like a
typical antecedent. If the trigger does not match a suitable directive
in the attention buffer, the operator is never considered for use.
Another important issue to consider is conflict resolution, when
more than one operator is applicable to a situation. We first find an-
tecedent matches where the facts are all above a certain belief thresh-
old. This threshold can change over time, for instance if the robot
is desperate to find some action to perform it can lower the thresh-
old. Next we look at each operator’s intrinsic preference to define a
probability of selection. Here the raw values can be modulated by
a function like exponentiation to shift the system’s operating point
along the explore-exploit continuum. For each operator above the
minimum threshold, we combine this transformed value with the op-
erator’s specificity (as measured by the number of matching nodes)
to get a final selection probability.
Arguably backwards chaining is also useful, particularly for re-
sponding to user-imposed goals. Yet language features, such as cut
in Prolog, are often introduced to keep logic-based systems from
needlessly chasing dead ends. Some systems separately authorize
chaining direction on a rule-by-rule basis [22]. Our approach is in-
stead based loosely on determinations [13]. These are not exact im-
plications but rather functional dependencies like “if you know a
person’s nationality, you likely know the language he speaks”. This
piece of knowledge can be translated into the forward chaining ad-
vice “if you want to know what language a person speaks, deter-
mine his nationality.” A separate forward chaining set of rules would
then capture the dependencies, such as “if a person is from Brazil,
he likely speaks Portuguese”. This is also reminiscent of the buffer
filling then harvesting pattern found in EPIC [21]. The application of
ALIA to perceptual reasoning using this approach is demonstrated in
[12].
Finally, backward-chaining symbolic planning systems can end up
agonizing over each step in deep plans. Yet, for the most part, humans
prefer to use shallow reasoning to string together pre-built templates
[30]. That is, when going to the airport I do not have to think about
opening the car door, sitting in the seat, turning on the ignition, etc.
Instead, I simple “drive the car”. For this reason, the consequents
of operators are not restricted to atomic actions but can be whole
sequential procedures with parallel paths and loops (cf. skills [24]).
Specifically, the procedure part of an operator consists of a sequen-
tial chain of plays. A play can be as simple as a single directive, and
it often is in the examples to be described in the next section. How-
ever, it can also be a set of parallel plays which must all complete
before moving on to the next step in the chain. In addition, a play can
have another non-required set of plays which are enabled while the
required set is running. These auxiliary activities are automatically
terminated, whether they are still running or not, when the main play
completes.
The functioning and interplay of various directive types should be-
come clearer during the discussion of the video demonstration, next.
4 VIDEO DEMONSTRATION
The video [11] shows several examples of the user teaching the robot
by talking to it. In this implementation the robot is fairly simple
and the bulk of the processing (speech, reasoning, control) happens
on a nearby Bluetooth-connected laptop. For sensing, the robot has
a forward-facing triangulation-based optical rangefinder. This is a
beam-like device mounted at the top of the gripper looking paral-
lel to the ground which can sense most objects out to about 40cm.
The robot also has a wifi-connected color camera, but it is not used
here. In terms of action, there are four degrees of freedom: two
wheels, a gripper, and a lift stage. The associated grounding kernel
responds to the commands drive, turn, grab/release, and raise/lower.
Each of these is configured as a discrete instead of continuing ac-
tion, although both modes could be present at the same time. That
is, “turn” causes the robot to reorient by a fixed angle rather than
spinning forever. The microcontroller on the robot takes care of gen-
erating pulses for the servos based on a serial communications line,
but simple timeout-based action amounts are governed by the laptop.
Although a typing interface also exists, the video demonstra-
tion has the user talking to the nearby laptop. The implementation
runs under Windows 10 and uses Microsoft Speech Recognizer 8.0
through SAPI calls. Although this is a relatively old engine, it has the
advantage of running locally so no network connection is required.
Also, speech recognition still has some accuracy problems and can
benefit from whatever additional constraints can be imposed. This
particular engine allows speaker-dependent acoustic models and can
be run in a mixed grammar/dictation mode. The use of grammar can
not only limit the vocabulary to reasonable terms, but can also en-
force preferred phrasing patterns. Thus, when the system is told to
“pick up the block” by a speaker with a foreign accent, it never er-
roneously hears “peacock the block”. Although “peacock” is a valid
English word, it obviously makes no sense in the robot deployment
context. Such mistakes can be difficult to detect and repair after the
fact.
4.1 Procedures
The most important advice a user can provide is how to accomplish
some task, such as “tidy up”. The small robot shown does not actually
perform this function but, as shown in the video, it can be taught to
dance through a sequence of verbal inputs:
To cha-cha drive forward then drive backwards
To shimmy turn left then turn right
To dance cha-cha then shimmy
When the user then says Please dance the robot performs all four
steps in sequence, something it was not able to do previously.
To process this sort of advice, the robot first listens to the user’s
speech as constrained by a Context Free Grammar. Figure 4 shows
the parse tree (left) resulting from the “cha-cha” utterance. This is
then digested into an association list (top right) consisting of a num-
ber of slots and values, along with constituent bracketing, by walking
the tree and retaining selected nodes. Finally, the a-list gets converted
to the internal representation (bottom right) of an operator which is
added to the policy.
The new operator is set up to match a DO directive where the trig-
gering situation is an action associated with the lexical item “cha-
cha”. As described earlier, all operators that match the command di-
rective are candidates for execution. However, this is modulated by
exactness of match (calculated as the number of nodes in correspon-
dence) and the operator’s intrinsic suitability. Although this defaults
to 1, it might be some other value depending on phraseology. For
example, “To cha-cha you could ...” would yield a preference of 0.8
while “To cha-cha you must always ...” results in a preference of 1.2.
Figure 4. The speech utterance To cha-cha drive forward then drive back-
wards undergoes several steps of natural language processing to become a
new operator.
These are user-supplied initial values but are subject to autonomous
alteration by the system over the course of time. For instance, re-
inforcement learning could adjust them based on the success/failure
of the suggested action, or they could be directly influenced by user
utterances such as “Hey, stop that!”.
The action part of the operator consists of a set of actions, here two
DO directives. As can be seen, the actual description of what to do in
each step is encoded as a semantic network. The first step is an action
(act-3) associated with the word “drive” which is modified by a
direction node (dir-5) associated with the word “forward”. The
second step is similar, except the direction is changed. The default is
for the directives to be run sequentially, but the user can also specify
concurrency by changing the conjunction used, e.g. “and” as opposed
to “then”. This does not make much sense for two drive commands,
but it is useful in other circumstances. For instance, “... drive forward
and turn right” causes the robot to move in an arc. Parallel execution
is also particularly useful for saying something while performing an
action.
trig:
DO[ act-1 -lex- drive
dir-1 -dir-> act-1 ]
pref: 1.0
---------------
FCN[ fcn-1 -lex- base_drive
-arg-> act-1 ]
Each step is posted as a subgoal in the attention buffer and, in
this case, will directly match a grounding function. This is a bridge
between the symbolic system and the robot controller. For instance,
the operator above matches any drive command having a direction
but does not constrain what that should be. When run, this invokes a
particular external function, (base drive) which has free access to
the semantic network in the calling sequence. This function looks for
words like “backward” as well as variants like “backwards” and can
also examine other adverbial modification not explicitly listed in the
trigger for the operator, such as “slowly”. Using these parameters, it
sets a speed for the robot and a timeout interval after which success
is declared (and the velocity reverts to the default of zero).
Note that while the grounding kernel automatically handles some
variants like turning “left” or “counterclockwise” there may be things
that were omitted, such as “widdershins”. This can be handled either
by specifying a new operator using the sentence “To turn widdershins
turn counterclockwise” or, alternatively, using a macro-like halo rule
“Widdershins means counterclockwise”. Similarly, the grounding
functions may have been written for the verb “rotate” instead of
“turn”. Here the aliasing rule approach is preferable. The user could
tell the robot “To turn left rotate left” but would also have to define
another operator for “turn right” (and possibly more if “fast” and
“slow” were used). Instead, by simply saying “turn means rotate” a
new lexical tag can be automatically added to the action node without
changing any of the modifiers.
if: act-1 -lex- turn
then: act-1 -lex- rotate
In the video, the top-level user command “Please dance” posts a
DO directive to the attention buffer. This is then matched to available
operators and converted to a sequence of two more DO directives
(cha-cha and shimmy). Each of these is resolved in turn to a sequence
of more primitive DO directives, which are eventually matched to
grounding operators like the one shown above. Note that grounding
functions can also fail. For instance, if the robot knew its absolute
position in the room and saw this was not changing, it could sig-
nal failure. At this point the architecture would backtrack and try a
different operator for “drive forward”. If none were found, it would
backtrack still further to “cha-cha” and then to “dance”.
4.2 Reactions
Advice is not limited to simple subroutine expansion but can also
encompass reactive behaviors. In the home robot scenario, Freddy
(the teenaged owner) might say “Close the door whenever you see
Mom coming”. The video shows a similar situation in which the user
tells the robot:
If something is very close then drive backwards
This behavior is not dependent on any top-level goal or command,
but rather is operational all the time. What happens in the imple-
mented system is that the robot continuously monitors its forward-
facing rangefinder and tests whether the reading is less than 5cm.
If so, the grounding kernel directly asserts the fact There is some-
thing very close by posting the directive shown below to the attention
buffer. This fact then automatically triggers suitable operators in the
same manner as a command issued by the user.
NOTE[ hq-1 -lex- close
-hq--> obj-1
deg-3 -lex- very
-deg-> hq-1 ]
If the robot is already working on some other command, this be-
comes an additional parallel action item. Generally, attentional foci
that are posted more recently have a higher priority for their actions.
The priorities are resolved within the grounding kernel. Suppose the
robot was previously using its wheels to turn left, then this new back-
wards command takes precedence. However, if the ongoing action
was merely to say something, there is no resource conflict and both
actions would happen simultaneously.
4.3 Prohibitions
Just as important as what to do is what not to do. For instance, in
the room cleanup scenario Freddy might want to say “Never touch
my sneakers!”. In the video, the small robot is given a portion of
Asimov’s First Law:
You should never grab a person
but instead say I’m not allowed to
What this does is preempt the grabbing action while simultaneously
generating a speech complaint, as encoded by the operator below.
trig:
ANTE[ act-2 -lex- grab
-obj-> obj-1
ako-4 -lex- person
-ako-> obj-1 ]
---------------
DO[ act-6 -lex- say
-obj-> txt-8
txt-8 -str- I’m not allowed to ]
PUNT[ ]
This illustrates the use of two more directives: ANTE and PUNT.
As described earlier, a DO directive automatically cycles through
three stages. It first gets converted to an ANTE directive and all ap-
plicable operators are run. It then becomes the core DO directive and
operators are tried until one succeeds or there are no more left, at
which point it fails. Finally, it is converted to a POST directive and
all those applicable operators are run to properly clean up. The key
to this prohibition is that it latches onto the factors considered be-
fore the main action is attempted. The other important part about this
operator is the use of the PUNT directive. This causes the current
chain to always fail and immediately initiates backtracking. Thus,
when grabbing is being considered, this operator is triggered to first
generate an utterance and then, when finished, to cause the top-level
user-imposed DO directive to terminate.
Unfortunately, the current system cannot reliably assess whether
an object is a human or not. However, it can be given some inference
rules along with a fact about the object being grabbed, as demon-
strated in the interaction:
If something is a girl it is a person
Mary is a girl
Grab Mary
The first sentence here results in a new halo rule:
if: ako-2 -lex- girl
-ako-> obj-1
then: ako-4 -lex- person
-ako-> obj-1
Using this, the declarative inference system automatically deduces
the fact that Mary is a person, even though this is not directly evident
from the top level “grab” command. That is, the user cannot get away
with an illegal command just because he failed to explicitly mention
that Mary was a person.
4.4 Permissions
Often prohibitions are not general in nature, but tied to specific peo-
ple, like permissions. For instance, Freddy might not like his pesky
little sister snooping in his room and so tells the robot “Do not show
Janey where my phone is but instead tell the squirt to get lost”. Again,
the video shows an analog to this scenario with the small robot. Here,
Rick is deemed to have lower authorization than other users.
Suppose these two directives have been instilled:
If Rick tells you to do something don’t but instead complain
To complain say I don’t take orders from you
The first of these results in an ANTE operator to handle the “don’t”,
similar to the grabbing example.
trig:
ANTE[ act-7
act-1 -lex- tell
-agt--> obj-3
-dest-> obj-5
-cmd--> act-7
obj-3 -lex- Rick
obj-5 -lex- you ]
-----------------
DO[ act-8 -lex- complain ]
PUNT[ ]
The reason this operator will work as intended hinges on the prac-
tice of pre-pending a speech act to every user utterance. A command
like “Turn right” actually posts a chain of two directives to the atten-
tion buffer as shown below.
NOTE[ input-4 -lex- tell
-agt--> user-3
-dest-> self-1
-cmd--> act-5 ]
DO[ act-5 -lex- turn
dir-7 -lex- right
-dir--> act-5 ]
Here the system first matches the NOTE directive to some relevant
handler, something like the acknowledgement “Okey Dokey”, before
moving on to the DO directive. However, in this case, the core of the
NOTE directive remains in working memory, recording the prove-
nance of the command. Coupled with the known properties:
user-3 -lex- Rick
self-1 -lex- you
this is sufficient to trigger the newly supplied “anti-Rick” operator.
As shown, this is composed of a DO directive to complain in some
way followed by a PUNT directive, which functions as before.
In this example we have also told the robot one way to complain:
by saying “I don’t take orders from you”. However, there could be
additional operators with different expansions, such as saying “For-
get it, puny human” or even making a rude noise. When handling the
DO operator, the system would choose randomly between these re-
sponses, assuming they all had the same preference. Notice that the
main “anti-Rick” operator would not need to be re-taught – all the
variation is modularly contained within the generic directive to com-
plain. Moreover, this complaining action could be reused in other
circumstances without having to specify exactly how it should be ac-
complished each time.
The end result is that when a random user asks the robot to move,
it complies. But when it knows that Rick is speaking, the robot digs
in its heels. Of course, preemptively refusing human orders could
become problematic in the long term.
5 DISCUSSION
While ALIA can do simple factual reasoning and knows how to
string procedures together, it should not be used to do everything. In-
stead, the intent is for the grounding functions to do most of the heavy
lifting, with natural language used for run-time scripting. In partic-
ular, the grounding functions can be arbitrarily complex, such as a
DNN-based object recognizer (invoked by “find the cereal box”) or
a vSLAM-based navigation system (invoked by “go to the kitchen”).
Furthermore, although ALIA itself is largely a symbolic system,
there is no reason that these libraries have to be. The combination,
in fact, has some interesting synergies where the “slow” ALIA sys-
tem enables migration of some tasks to the “fast” grounding system
[19].
For instance, the robot might be told “The bottle to the left of
the green box is Advil”. Using linguistic interpretation and primi-
tive object segmentation, it can determine what portion of the image
corresponds to mentioned item. But now, since it also has the label
“Advil”, it can submit the pair as a training example to a DNN. This
could in turn help the robot more directly spot the item amidst clut-
ter in the future. This same approach of verbal guidance of attention
then labeling can be used in other areas, as well. For instance, the
user could say “To get to Tim’s office, go out the door, turn left, then
enter the third door on your right”. Again, ALIA would follow these
symbolic directions to traverse one particular path to the destination.
However, meanwhile vSLAM could be running in the background
building a map of the environment the robot was passing through,
and bind the designation “Tim’s office” to the endpoint. Over time
this should eventually let the robot get to Tim’s office from a variety
of different starting locations using conventional path planning.
In the big picture, humans rarely discover new things or invent
new processes. Rather, the majority of what they do and what they
know is passed through culture, and the prime vector for this is lan-
guage. Enabling learning from language allows robots to share in this
culture. Users can teach the robot what to think, do, and say. The im-
plemented examples here show how a user can interact with the robot
to:
• give explicit commands (e.g. “drive forward”)
• guide it in performing some task (e.g. “to cha-cha”)
• instruct it how to respond to events (e.g. “very close”)
• explain how the world works (e.g. “a girl is a person”)
• lay down ethical constraints (e.g. “don’t grab”)
• communicate notions of trust (e.g. “Rick”)
• impart a personality (e.g. “complain”)
This demonstrates how powerful language can be, and how it can
help bootstrap AI agents closer to human-like behavior.
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